NATO Chief Scientist Research Report: Resilience

The Chief Scientist Research Reports (CSRRs) provide NATO’s senior political and military leadership with clear, evidence-based insight into science & technology (S&T) developments. These reports translate complex research results into actionable analysis to help the Alliance anticipate potential technological disruption, identify likely capability gaps, and adapt strategically in order to shape the future security environment and battlespace.

NATO is facing an unpredictable strategic environment where competitors and adversaries seek to exploit the openness and interconnectedness of the Nations within the Alliance, as well as targeting the security of Allies’ citizens through hybrid tactics, either directly or through proxies. Strategic competition, instability and recurrent shocks define NATO’s broader security environment and, in particular, the lines between conventional and unconventional conflicts can be blurred. The use of new technologies provides benefits as well as vulnerabilities to our societies due to interdependencies within the economic, financial, information and cyber areas.

Each NATO Ally must be resilient to withstand major shocks such as a natural disaster, failure of critical infrastructure, or a hybrid or armed attack. Resilience is the individual and collective capacity to prepare for, resist, respond to and quickly recover from shocks and disruptions, and to ensure the continuity of the Alliance’s activities. Resilience is both a national responsibility and a collective commitment. It is rooted in Article 3 of the 1949 Washington Treaty, setting out that Allies will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist attack. Thus, one Nation’s resilience contributes to the resilience of the whole Alliance, positioning national and collective resilience as essential enablers for credible deterrence and defence, and supporting the fulfilment of the Alliance’s three core tasks.

Strengthening preparedness for deterrence and defence, therefore, requires a whole-of-government approach with whole-of-society considerations including active cooperation across government, public-private cooperation, societal resilience considerations, and a wide range of military and civilian capabilities. Resilience also strengthens deterrence by keeping more options open longer, thereby diminishing the likelihood of conflict and crises escalations.

Hybrid operations, or operations below the threshold of Article 5, against Allies could reach the level of an armed attack and lead the North Atlantic Council to initiate a response under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. The Russian Federation has intensified its hybrid actions against Allies through various means, such as sabotage, acts of violence, provocations, cyber-attacks, electronic interference, and malign political influence, constituting a threat to the Alliance’s security. The ambitions and policies stated by The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) pose systemic challenges to NATO’s interests, security and values. The PRC and Russia have deliberately used crises to weaken governance, such as through financial crisis, immigration crisis, COVID-19 and turning the digital domain into a weapon of misinformation.

Aggressive and intentional actions against critical infrastructure such as energy supplies and communication systems impact national and NATO’s security and defence and are continuously exploited by adversaries to achieve both short- and long-term goals. Systemic hybrid war by an adversary can include degrading any systems vital to the critical functioning of the state or continuity of government and governance, thereby exploring and impacting national resilience and robustness. Actions taken against the energy sector in Ukraine are an example of how civilian infrastructure could be targeted to impact resilience.

Technology is a primary driver of new opportunities, challenges and threats to Allies’ security and defence. Emerging and advanced technology and technological systems can be used to build resilience while reducing vulnerabilities. As NATO is accelerating its transformation, integrating new technologies and innovation, and improving technological adoption to derive decisive advantage from technology across all Instruments of Power, these approaches are also relevant for building resilience.

For example, NATO Allies agree that energy is a critical capability enabler for military forces. As energy technologies and systems evolve, tracking innovative energy technologies and identifying their military applications with resilience, effectiveness and interoperability across the Alliance in mind, can contribute to their timely adoption and provide strategic advantages to the Alliance.

The Alliance has experienced challenges impacting health systems, exemplified by COVID-19, which exposed vulnerabilities within global supply chains, leading many Nations to reevaluate their global dependencies on critical goods and services. Thus, preparedness planning for severe crises and war is crucial for building national resilience, deterrence and defence. This demonstrates the importance of building resilience to strengthen NATO’s defence and deterrence and crises prevention and management. Effective resilience calls for active consequence management, including in relation to cyber defences, civilian structures important for maintaining military effort and military mobility, and prevention of information threats on social media. Building resilience through partnerships among Allies and partners and with organisations such as the European Union is also crucial for NATO’s cooperative security.

Lessons learned from Ukraine emphasise the importance of a whole-of-society approach to strengthen resilience, including also appropriate legislation, as there is a need to strengthen joint planning between civil and military stakeholders.

Read the full report below.